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Executive Summary: 
 
 
  
After years of integration in other sectors, the member states decided to include foreign and 
defence policy to EU cooperation. Therefore, it is now, after a few decades, a good moment 
to look critically at what has been achieved in this sector of EU defence cooperation. With 
this reason, this thesis will approach the question, why do the member states want defence 
integration to happen in smaller groups? This question can be split in multiple sub-questions. 
Firstly, could reaction of the member states be out of discontent of how cooperation is 
functioning on a EU-level? Secondly, does the EU allow the member states to continue in 
smaller groups, instead of moving forward as a Union? These question will be approached 
by using a variety of documents. For example, not only the EU perspective but also the 
national interests of member states and the vision of experts on defence integration should 
be taken into consideration as well as useful sources for this thesis.  
Furthermore by looking at theories of defence integration in the EU, such as, 
Institutionalism, constructivism and realist theory, this thesis will try to find the motives for 
defence integration. Using the patterns of the theory will make it easier to analyse and 
compare the cases that will be included in this thesis. The three selected cases are from a 
different scale. From cooperation on a Union-level to bilateral cooperation and integration. 
As a result, this thesis has to add additional information and perspectives on the integration 
of defence within the EU. 
Keywords: 
Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP), Defence integration, German defence, Dutch 
defence, European Defence Agency (EDA), Multi-speed Europe. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to the topic 
“Europe is usually more willing to define itself as a soft power, which we are, and 
a very successful one. But getting at least some integrated defence capacities is 
something we cannot do without. The choice here is not between hard and soft 
power. It is between being a global power or a powerless spectator of regional and 
global events that concern us Europeans in any case. Like it or not” (Mogherini, 
29-04-2015).  
This is what the European Union (EU) High Representative Mogherini stated in her speech in 
April 2015. This statement indicates that external policies, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, are not functioning properly.  
Therefore, this is a good introduction of the subject of this master thesis. With so much unrest 
in the world and to be more specific at the borders of the EU, security and defence is a very 
important topic for the EU and its member states. In addition to this, not only the unrest at the 
borders but also inside the EU have a big influence on the policymaking process in Brussel. 
With budget cuts due to the financial crisis, the member states are now looking towards each 
other for help more than ever.  
With defence integration becoming an important development in the EU, it could also become 
a solution for keeping the armed forces up-to-date and create a bigger role for the EU in the 
world. However, over the last decades no real progress has been made and member states are 
starting to exploit other options. Therefore, the question that this thesis wants to approach will 
be: why do the member states want defence integration to happen in smaller groups? This 
question can be split up in multiple sub-questions. First, could the response of the member states 
be out of discontent of how cooperation is functioning on a EU-level? Secondly, does the EU 
allow the member states to continue in smaller groups, instead of moving forward as a Union? 
These questions will be approached by using a variety of documents. Not only for the 
perspective of Mogherini’s statement and that of the EU because this is not the only way to 
zoom in on the subject of this master thesis. For example, not only the EU perspective but also 
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the national interests of member states and the vision of experts on defence integration should 
be taken into consideration as well as useful sources for this thesis.  
To make this subject better to access, this thesis will have the following structure. Firstly, in 
chapter 2, a small historic overview will be given. This could give a good background on EU 
defence integration over the last decades. This is important, because not every action or decision 
is always rational, it could also be symbolical. Therefore, a small historical overview could give 
some insight in decisions made in the past and in the present time. Secondly, in chapter 3, a 
small overview of theories behind integration will be given. Thirdly, in chapter 4, cases will be 
presented. These cases are selected because of their different nature and scale. Fourthly in 
chapter 5, the current situation will be explained. This will include the achievements and 
problems the member states face and the possible solutions that are available to overcome this. 
This is of importance because theories can provide this thesis with the motivations behind 
integration. And finally, the thesis will end with an conclusion about the research. 
The cases, as mentioned above will be about the integration of defence between one or more 
countries. Case 1, will be about the Dutch 11 ‘Luchtmobiele Brigade’ and the German ‘Division 
Schnelle Kräfte’. Case 2, will be about BeNeSam, Belgian-Dutch cooperation and integration 
that takes place in the navy of both countries. And the third and final case will be about the 
sharing and pooling of Air-to-Air refuelling (AAR) capabilities under the influence of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA). In addition to this, researching these cases could explain 
why this integration is taking place in these sectors of defence and why on this level. Finding 
out what the main motivators are, could give better insight and future prospect in defence 
integration. Furthermore, this could motivate EU member states to go even further. This 
difference in willingness of the member states to integrate in this policy area could very well 
force the EU to approach this policy area in different ‘ways’. 
1.2 Introduction to the selected methods 
This thesis will try to approach ‘forms’ of defence integration. Therefore, it would be wise to 
start looking into cases of integration of defence between two or more countries and EU-wide 
integration in defence. However, create a well-structured thesis, focusing on relevant 
information is important. In other words, the question of this thesis has to act as a guideline to 
create an understanding of how the methods will be used and what the positive and negative 
sides are when we use methods to approach this subject. The positive aspects, in the case of 
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methods, is the information a method can deliver when being used. However, the negative 
aspects of using a method are that the method fails to consider and include important 
information. Therefore, using multiple cases and methods could create a solid foundation for 
this thesis. 
Selecting methods based on ‘case studies’ for this thesis is the next step to take. According to 
some researchers using case studies as a method is not commendable because these cases are 
seen as a mere outcome of a question that has been asked (Phare, 2005, p.114). In other words, 
the researcher would only test if the outcome of his hypotheses is right or wrong. However, 
according to others, case studies can provide us with a lot of information on the ‘social’ side of 
research. They state that “social scientific research proceeds through a more interactive process 
between theory and evidence in which case-study methods excel” (Phare, 2005, p.114). In other 
words, case studies would allow us to look at the process and the how and why one situation 
lead to another.  
Another rather ‘negative’ term that is used a lot for case study methods is that it is a qualitative 
method and not a quantitative method (Barkin, 2009, p.211). In other words, in case studies 
each case is most likely to be unique. In a quantitative research an experiment can be exactly 
replicated and then it should have the same results. However, this is not the case with qualitative 
research. For example, currently the Dutch Minister of Defence decided to partly integrate with 
German defence units. Then again, because the Minister is a person and every person is unique, 
the outcome of the decision to integrate or not to integrate could be very different. Therefore, 
it would be hard to recreate the environment to test if a theory is right or wrong. This is one of 
the things that needs to be kept in mind when doing the research for this thesis based on case 
studies.  
Another problem that is mentioned in combination with qualitative research is the matter of 
subjectivity. When gathering all necessary data to approach the case of defence integration, a 
selection bias, errors made by the researcher and interpretation of the researcher, can happen 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2006, p.196). Therefore, to approach this subject we have to use a strict 
framework that would make this research easily accessible for others, this way other researchers 
can still approach the subject and fill-in additional data or falsify theories that are made. 
As mentioned earlier, interaction between theory and process is made possible by using case 
studies as a method. This is interesting for this paper because the question is about defence 
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integration, a well-used case study method could give us not only data on what lead to defence 
integration, but also give insight on how and why. Furthermore, different cases of integration 
on multiple levels within the EU or between countries could provide us with interesting results 
on reasons of integration. We must not forget that after the failing of the European Defence 
Community (EDC) in 1954, it took until the Maastricht treaty in 1992 to bring defence 
integration up again. The problem with the idea of defence integration in the late 1940s is the 
idea of giving-up sovereignty in a very delicate policy area that touches the core of a state 
(Dinan, 2014, p.65-66). Therefore, recognizing prime reasons for integration in defence could 
be highly interesting because this is an indication of a ‘window of opportunity’ that could be of 
use to policy and decision makers in the future. 
Because we need case study methods, we want to take a closer look at the following two forms 
of case studies. The first one to be explained is ‘congruence’ and the second one is ‘process 
tracing’. After that a small section will be devoted to the methods of interviews as a way to 
support the case study methods. 
1.2.1 Case studies: Congruence 
The first method that will be used in this thesis is the congruence method. The congruence 
method is of importance to this thesis because it allows the user to have “a single case or a small 
number of cases for theory development” (George and Bennett, 2005, p.181). Because, in 
comparison to other policy areas, the Common Foreign and Security Policy is rather young, 
there are not that many cases available yet. In addition to this, this method does not depend on 
a large amount of cases, one could even argue that one case is enough to use this method.  
However, researchers state that using the congruence method for research could create 
weaknesses as well. For example, a larger amount of cases would strengthen the theory more 
because it can be tested more often and with repeatedly the same outcome the theory becomes 
stronger. Then again, the question of this paper could very well lead to researching a small 
amount of cases. With that in mind, the chance of a variable being excluded while it is of 
influence on the ‘outcome’ becomes bigger (George and Bennett, 2005, p.183). To further 
explain, when we do not include these variables, it could lead to a fragile and inconclusive 
theory.  
Beach & Pedersen make the same observation, they state that even though you have the best 
resources it would still be impossible to gain information on all the variables (Beach & Pedersen, 
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2013, p.68). With this in mind, it could be possible that not every variable can be included. 
Then again, when this is the case it should be made clear which variables are included and 
which are left out. This could then make it easier to see what fields could add something to the 
subject. 
In addition to the weaknesses already mention, George and Bennett point us to three other 
‘problems’ that come with using the method of congruence. These problems are Spuriousness, 
Causal Priority and Casual Depth (George and Bennett, 2005, p.185). This is of high importance 
to consider when we approach the subject of this thesis. Because these points could fail a 
research when they are not addressed or kept in mind properly. 
1.2.2 Case studies: Process tracing   
The case study has to confirm what the cause of integration is. However, integration is also 
about decision making by people and people that have to work with these decisions. Therefore, 
this paper will also include interviews to gain unique information that could support us in 
approaching the question of this paper. 
While the congruence method is more about identifying key variables, process tracing could 
give us another way of approaching the subject of this essay. This method “attempts to identify 
the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an 
independent variable and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and Bennett, 2005, 
p.206). To further explain, the focus of ‘process tracing’ will be more on the ‘process’, from 
cause to outcome. Therefore, it could give a lot more information on extra variables that the 
congruence method could have missed. Therefore, ‘process tracing’ could compliment the 
congruence method by further zooming in at the case at hand. 
Another front that process tracing can complement in is the question of “when is there enough 
data” (Checkel, 2009, 121). As mentioned earlier, the ‘trap’ of this kind of research is that 
researcher need to provide a lot of data to counter the negative view on qualitative research. 
However, when is it enough? Therefore, a clear statement must be made on what is included 
and excluded and what kind of sources were used to fill the gaps at hand or that there are still 
gaps in the research. 
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1.2.3 Method for Interviews: 
Another way to fill the gaps in information in this thesis about defence integration is for 
example, conducting interviews. We have multiple variations of interviewing, however, this 
thesis will only use semi-structured variations of interviews.  
Semi-structured interviews, in comparison with structured interviews, leave the interviewer 
some room to collect comparable data. However, the interview also leaves room for some 
additional questions if the situation allows it (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006, np.). In addition to this, 
semi-structured interviews could give the interviewer some other perspectives and variables to 
look at the subject (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006, np.). As mentioned before, a structured interview 
leaves no room for additional questions other than the ones on the list. However, a semi-
structured interview can leave some room for the person answering the questions to create a 
‘side track’.  
There are, like in other ways of conducting an interview, disadvantages to using a semi-
structured interview. This because, the interviewer has to steer the conversation. Then again, if 
the interviewer is not capable to control the interview, it could become useless. Also, some state 
that it is difficult to find useable data in the unstructured part of the interview because there is 
nothing to compare it with and in addition to this, selecting the data leaves the researcher room 
to leave things out (McLeod, 2014, np.). In other words, the researcher could have the 
possibility to be bias. This is something that should be countered with supporting the data with 
additional methods such as the methods mentioned earlier in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2: History of Defence integration and Cooperation in the EU 
 
2.1 Introduction to European Defence history 
For the purpose of creating a historical background for this thesis, this chapter will be about the 
steps made in the sector of defence integration in the period after the Second World War. This 
is of importance because progress and mistakes of the past could give an insight in how and 
why some decisions are made in the present and possibly in the future. This because defence 
integration or cooperation is not only of this time but also part of negotiations in the early days 
of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Therefore, this section of history will be 
dedicated to the period from the moment the ECSC was created until the Lisbon treaty. 
2.2 EU and defence: 1948-1990 
The signing of the treaty of the ECSC was only a solution to one part of a question that was 
keeping the allies, especially France, occupied in the 1950s. The overall question during that 
period was, what should be done with Germany? The ECSC was only a solution for the 
economic part to restore Germany politically and economically (Topan, 2001, p.37). However, 
German remilitarization was another part of this problem. The US wanted a good and strong 
West-Germany because it needed a strong ally in Europe that would be able to stand up against 
the threat from the east, the Soviet Union (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.40). On the other 
hand, the Soviet Union shared this discontent, German remilitarization after the World Wars 
that took place, with France and did not even have to convince France to act against this idea 
(Rosenberg, 2005, p.54). Therefore, even though the ECSC was created, the First and Second 
World Wars left their scars and fear on the European continent.  
Being pressured by the US and the UK, France constructed a proposal that was in the line of 
thinking with the creation of the ECSC. They proposed a European Defence Community (EDC) 
that is in other words, a European army (Dinan, 2014, p.65). This way the futures of both 
Germany and France would be connected and would share the burdens and benefits together. 
This would then solve the problem of a Germany that becomes too strong again. However, in 
the end the French themselves could not go through with this and it was therefore voted down 
by the French parliament, leaving a scar on French credibility (Dinan, 2014, p.65-68).  
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After the failed French proposal, the German question of remilitarization still needed to be 
solved rather quickly because the threat from the east still remained. Therefore, the UK 
proposed the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), a version of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), only with European countries (Western European Union, n.d.). 
The structure of the WEU was not something new because a large portion of the structure was 
already agreed upon in 1948 in the Brussels treaty between the UK, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Rosenberg, 2005, 54). In addition to this, instead of creating 
a supranational army, as proposed by the EDC, the WEU focused on using national armies 
(Rosenberg, 2005, 54). In other words, this was a solution that was acceptable for all parties 
and resulted in the opportunity for Germany to rearm. 
Some researchers state that the failure of the plan for the EDC was the reason for a taboo on 
defence integration and losing fifty years filled with opportunities to further integrate and 
cooperate in defence (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.41). Other researchers say that after the 
creation of the WEU there was no need for talks about enhanced cooperation or integration in 
the defence sector because there was no reason to do so until the late 1980s early 1990s (Dinan, 
2014, 239). However, this all changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This brought forward 
two things: the loss of purpose of NATO and the fact that the US declared its decreasing interest 
in the European region. With this reason, the EU was forced into this position to take action in 
this policy area by the US (Dover, 2013, 242). 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, some state that the institutions of defence cooperation lost 
their sense of purpose. For example, the main reason for NATO to be there was to form an 
alliance to protect each other from the Soviet Union. However, now that the Soviet Union had 
fallen, there was no need for the NATO any longer. In addition to this, Harries is concluding 
the same about NATO by stating that, “It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 
"East" to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity. It is extremely doubtful whether it can 
now survive the disappearance of that enemy” (Harries, 1992-1993, 42). In other words, this 
uncertainty of whether it will stay in place or disappear left the EU with an opening to step up 
and take responsibility. Therefore, after a long period of silence, the talks about defence 
cooperation and integration the 1990s and 2000s where a complete turnaround of the last 5 
decades.  
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2.3 From the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty of Nice: 
With the treaty of Maastricht two ‘pillars’ where added, as a sign that the member states wanted 
to cooperate further in these sectors. The most important pillar for this thesis is the pillar of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, adding the policy areas was one thing, 
making it effective and functional is a completely different problem. In the light of the 
Yugoslavia-conflict it was made clear that the EU was all but ready to act (Dinan, 2014, p.240-
241).  As a result, there were heavy debates about the effectiveness of the CFSP and it was even 
stated that it is an empty and panicked response of the member states towards the problems of 
the world (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.47). As a response for these critics, additional 
agreements were made in the treaty of Amsterdam.  For example, the EU worked towards a 
more common position for the member states by adding the position of High Representative 
and creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, 
p.51). In addition, this gave the EU external policies a face for the outside world and an 
institutional body to regulate meetings and create a common position for the EU. Furthermore, 
it also shows that the EU and the member states are thinking about more cooperation in the 
defence sector under the ESDP.  
This vision of the member states of a common position was made clearer in the years that 
followed after the creation of the ESDP. With the wars in the Middle-East, as a reaction to the 
terrorist attacks on the US, the focus of the US visibly shifted away from the European continent 
(Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p.54). To further explain, with this reasoning, the EU needed a 
strategy, common goals for all the member states. Therefore, in 2003 the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) was created, paving a way for future EU defence integration and common 
objectives (Gnesotto, 2003, p.3-4).  
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Chapter 3: Motivations and explanations for defence cooperation and 
integration 
 
3.1 Introduction to defence integration theory 
The previous chapter gave a brief insight in the EU defence integration and cooperation history. 
However, what this previous chapter could not answer and what this thesis wants to approach 
is, how and why countries want to integrate further in defence. This chapter will try to approach 
the different ways of looking at defence integration. However, before being able to place the 
motives of integration in the right context, there is a need to explain the theories that will be 
used to find these motives. This will be necessary to create an equal field of comparison between 
different cases of defence integration and cooperation. Furthermore, using these theories could 
help predict and tell people what would happen in some scenarios of integration. 
As mentioned before, what is the reason for integration and why in this form? These are some 
of the questions that need to be approached in this thesis. In an article written by Möttölä, three 
reason for defence integration are summarized under their respective theories.  According to 
Möttölä, the realist dimension, the institutionalist dimension and the constructivist dimension 
are the dimensions where the main drivers for defence integration can be found (Möttölä, 2007, 
p.2). These theories could point out the reasons for integration, therefore, it is of importance to 
further understand what they add and what there weakness could be. 
3.2 The Realist theory 
The realist theory is one of the oldest theories in European integration. According to the theory 
it is all about the “distribution of state power within the regime” and cooperation is acceptable, 
only if it is necessary for state survival (Cini, 2013, p.72). In addition to this, a prime 
characteristic is the “egoistic passions” as Donnelly states in his article (Donnelly, 2000, p.10). 
Furthermore, the fact that countries act in their self-interest also means that a group of countries 
will not always find a common ground. In other words, ideas and national interests of the 
countries conflict with one another (Cini, 2013, p.72-73). States as leading players and power 
and benefits as their reward of further defence integration, makes this an interesting theory to 
use in finding motivations for integration. 
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3.3 The institutionalist theory 
In contrast of realists, institutionalist see the institutions as the main factor of deeper integration 
(Rosamond, 2013, 90). In other words, the institutions, in their search for more competences, 
attract more and more sectors for integration. According to Vleuten, this is largely because of 
the so called “principal-agent” effect. Vleuten states that because states delegate the “principals” 
to an institution like the EU and the receiving institutions want to “agent” these “principals” the 
best they can (Vleuten, 2010, p.233-234). Therefore, one could argue that because the 
institutions want to fulfil the roll of protecting the added competence they will stretch their 
“agent”-role to the maximum.   
However, Rosamond mentions a disadvantage pointed out by institutionalism, institutions most 
of the time outlive their creators and therefore the impact of these institutions could become 
clear several years later (Rosamond, 2013, p.91). In other words, carelessly placing 
competences in the care of institutions could have a great impact later without the member 
states realizing it. Furthermore, with the history of the EU in mind, states will think twice of 
placing something under institutional control (Vleuten, 2010, p.234). Therefore, this makes 
clear that the states are still a large player in deeper integration. 
3.4 The constructional theory 
The constructionists look at European integration by looking at the created norm, use of 
language and the ideas of an identity (Rosamond, 2013, p.94). In other words, a constructivist 
looks at the norms that are in place because this forms the identity in how it acts and grows. 
However, Checkel mentions a downside to how constructivism is currently used. Checkel states 
that constructivists most of  the time use process tracing, therefore, this approach neglects meta-
data that could be of importance because there is no common standard of using this in 
constructivism (Checkel, 2007, p.60). 
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Chapter 4:  Selected Cases 
 
1. Case: Integration of the Dutch Airmobile Brigade in the German 
Division Schnell Kräfte 
4.1.1 Historical Background 
After the Second World War and even until a couple of decades ago, thinking about integration 
of defence with Germany was almost impossible. However, since 2014 the integration of the 
Dutch 11e luchtmobiele brigade and the German Division Schnelle Kräfte was started and it 
will not end with integrating these divisions alone (Ministry of Defence, 30-10-2015, p.9). 
Currently, the integration takes place under German command and will be finished in 2019. 
With this form of integration. The Netherlands and Germany are one of the first EU member 
states to do this kind of integration (EU2016, 24-02-2016). In other words, the Netherlands and 
Germany are showing that they want to take a leading role in this form of integration within the 
EU. 
4.1.2 Way of Governance 
In the case of cooperation with Germany and the Netherlands, highly influential consultative 
bodies are created to be able to cooperate more closely with one another. This is necessary to 
create unity in approaches. For example, while the Dutch ground-to-air defence is arranged by 
the army, the Germans use the air force to facilitate this (Ministry of Defence, 30-10-2015, p.7). 
Both the German and the Dutch Minister of Defence want “integrated command and control 
structures on a permanent basis to ensure unity of command in operations and exercises. At 
service level, units could be placed under common operational command and be deeply 
integrated on a permanent basis while remaining stationed at their peace-time locations” (Dutch 
and German Government, 10-06-2013, p.5). In other words, units and soldiers could be placed 
under the command of the countries in question. 
4.1.3 Strategic Cultural Background 
Looking into the strategic cultural background is of importance because this will tell a lot about 
the how and why countries like the Netherlands and Germany want to integrate in the part of 
the defence sector. As mentioned by Schaper in the questionnaire, integration in its total is 
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based on both practical and political motives (Schaper, 2016, See Appendix 2). This practical 
side of cooperation and integration is also mentioned by the lieutenant general Kasdorf. He 
stated that the German Army wants a “future-oriented full spectrum operational army” and the 
way to achieve this is finding partners, like the Netherlands, to acquire these capabilities 
(Kasdorf, 2014, 205). Therefore, Germany, instead of trying to reach this requirements 
themselves, chose to find partners to learn from and in case of the Netherlands even fill some 
of these requirements.  
However, besides the practical side of this form of integration, there is also a political side. 
According to Kasdorf, with the continuous changes in this highly globalizing world and scarce 
budgetary resources it became essential to tightly cooperate in this sector (Kasdorf, 2014, p.201). 
In other words, cooperation with other partners is necessary because otherwise it would be 
highly unlikely that, in this case, Germany can continue this course. Therefore, if this is already 
a problem for a big country like Germany, it will be even harder for a medium size country, 
such as the Netherlands, to keep up with the modern requirements for a full operational army.  
The Dutch minister of Defence has the same opinion. She stated in a speech at the ALDE 
seminar on defence that “cooperation achieved by smaller groups could of course also be 
opened up to other member states at a later stage” however, it is also clear that you cannot force 
countries to cooperate (Hennis-Plasschaert, 24-06-2015). This highlights the political idea 
because only countries with the same norms, values and ideas can cooperate with each other. 
However, the idea of starting small and growing bigger, something also mentioned in the 
chapter about the current situation in EU defence policy, is not new in the EU. Therefore, this 
could be the reason why cooperation on a EU level is proceeding so slowly and the focus of the 
member states is more on cooperation in smaller clusters. 
4.1.4 Capabilities 
The Netherlands and Germany, as mentioned earlier, want to form a full spectrum operational 
army. The capabilities of both forces can complement each other because both divisions are 
ideal for rapid deployment in faraway regions (Dickow, Drent, Landman, Overhaus & Zandee, 
2013, p.5). It consists out of 2000 Dutch soldiers (Ministry of Defence, 11 Luchtmobiele 
Brigade) and 9500 German soldiers (Bundeswehr, Die Division Schnelle Kräfte). 
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2. Case: Navy integration between Belgium and the Netherlands 
4.2.1 Historical Background 
While cooperation or even integration was out of the question in the case of Germany, Belgium 
and the Netherlands already signed a treaty of Belgian-Dutch Cooperation (BeNeSam) in 1948 
(Fokkema, 2012, 579). However, over time it flourished in to even more than cooperation. A 
few decades later, the present BeNeSam reached a pointed of two heavily integrated naval 
forces. 
4.2.2 Way of Governance 
After more than 50 years of cooperation and integration the structure was formed as we 
currently know it. However, even though there is integration, the states themselves have full 
sovereignty over the use of their ships and only in times of war, there will be one Benelux 
Commander (Homan, 2012, p.15-16). Highly interesting is what Homan stated in his article is 
something applicable to defence cooperation in the EU and between other countries. He argues 
the importance of standardisation because buying the same systems makes countries want to 
have optimal use of the chance of cooperating with each other while using these systems 
(Homan, 2012, p.16).  
4.2.3 Strategic Cultural Background 
Looking into the strategic cultural background is of importance because this will tell a lot about 
the how and why countries like the Netherlands and Belgium want to cooperate or in this case 
even integrate. The benefit here for both countries is besides having full sovereignty over their 
own ships that there are no double cost because there is only one school to educate navy 
personnel specialised in sea-mines warfare for two nations (Homan, 2012, p.16). In other words, 
they achieve the same they always had at a lower cost. Therefore, both ministers of defence 
achieved their goals of keeping their forces up-to-date for the lowest cost. This is also something 
that Fokkema mentions in her article about defence cooperation and integration between 
Belgium and the Netherlands. She states that both the Netherlands and Belgium want to keep 
their forces operable and this can be achieved by reducing costs through cooperation and not 
by further cuts in the defence budget (Fokkema, 2012, p.583). In other words, this is an 
indication that even though countries cooperate this does not necessarily mean the government 
  Leiden University 
  
S0835102 20 
 
can cut in the budget even more. In addition, this implicates that cooperation is a necessity for 
keeping the forces up-to-date in the current defence climate if the budget stays the same. 
4.2.4 Capabilities 
Besides close cooperating with one another due to the fact that they have a bilateral command 
structure, there are two other big gains. Firstly, creating one school for education and training 
for both countries. For example, the creation of the Belgian-Dutch École de la Geurre des Mines 
(Eguermin) in Belgium, which also became a  NATO Naval Mine Warfare Centre of Excellence 
(NMW COE)(Eguermin, n.d.). In addition, this improved cooperation due to the same training 
and reduced costs for not having two of the same schools. 
Secondly, both countries specializing in one specific part of the navy fleet for repairs and 
upgrades made this cooperation interesting and beneficial. For example, the Netherlands takes 
care of the maintenance and repair of the M-frigates of both countries and Belgium has the same 
responsibilities but then with the minesweepers of both countries (Homan, 2012, p.16). 
Therefore, specialization by both of the countries in their specific sector created the chance to 
reduce costs of having to have expertise in both vessels. Therefore, this could be a good example 
of the benefits of sharing and pooling resources in the defence sector. 
 
3. Case: Air-to-Air refuelling 
4.3.1 Historical Background 
While AAR is a system that has been active for a long period of time, the EU and its member 
states noticed only recently that they need such a system for themselves. After the introduction 
of the Maastricht treaty, the Kosovo conflict in 1999 and the Libya conflict in 2011 made it 
painfully clear that the EU is not ready to do autonomous missions (Platteau, 2014, p.13). For 
example, the US did 80% of the AAR while the US itself was only responsible for a quarter of 
the sorties in the conflict with Libya because the EU could not even sustain a mid-size operation 
(Quintana, Heidenkamp & Codner, 2014, p.6), (Platteau, 2012, p.16). Therefore, it became a 
pooling and sharing priority in 2011 for the EDA (European Defence Agency, 24-03-2014). In 
other words, the EDA did see an opportunity to make it possible for the EU to assist the member 
states in defence matters. 
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4.3.2 Way of Governance 
To understand where the AAR fits in the EU, the position of the EDA needs to be explained 
first. The EDA reports to the Council of the EU and the Ministers of Defence of the member 
states decide on the guidelines and budget of the EDA (European Defence Agency, n.d., about 
Governance). Currently, High Representative Federica Mogherini is the head of the EDA.  This 
is important because this indicates that the idea of having an AAR project run by the EDA, is 
that it can be used EU-wide. The AAS, as can be seen in Appendix 1 table 1, capabilities, 
armaments and technology are one of the four tasks of the EDA. 
4.3.3 Strategic Cultural Background 
Looking into the strategic cultural background is of importance because this will tell a lot about 
the how and why the EU countries wanted to organize this on a EU-level in the EDA.  The first 
advantage is that this project can be accessed by all the member states of the EU. In 2012 
“ministers declared their willingness to support further development of air-to-air refuelling 
capabilities and to better coordinate them. They agreed that aerial refuelling capabilities should 
be developed in Europe as a matter of priority; and that these capabilities should be made 
available for potential use during EU, NATO, or other framework operations” (European 
Defence Agency, 24-03-2014). In other words, high accessibility for all the countries make it 
in this case interesting to cooperate on a EU-level. 
Another point that has been made is about the cost of having an AAR fleet. With the economic 
crisis having effect on the budgets on defence it has been mentioned that most of the member 
states cannot afford to maintain the correct level of AAR (and Air Transportation) in multiple 
scenarios at the same time (Quintana, Heidenkamp & Codner, 2014, p.10). Therefore, it will be 
of tactical importance for the member states to cooperate on this point to make sure that every 
mission over the complete spectrum of situations can be undertaken. Furthermore, even though 
states want to act autonomous without having the means to do it, they would be better of sharing 
and pooling these resources then not being capable of doing anything at all. 
4.3.4 Capabilities 
The current capabilities are far too low. That is why the EU wants to achieve readiness in 2020. 
Reaching full operational autonomy is one of the key factors in this area (Platteau, 2012, p.16). 
In other words, the EU wants to be fully capable of doing missions of all scales, without any 
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help of external countries. However, because this project still needs to be finished in 2020 only 
the intentions are mentioned by the EDA. Then again, the EDA does not mention the quantity 
of aircrafts that are needed to fill these intentions and guidelines of the member states.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion of the Cases and the current situation in EU defence 
integration 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters acted as a foundation for this chapter to form a discussion and give an 
overview of EU defence integration of today and for in the future. Bringing the cases in contact 
with the theory and history, this chapter will be about current projects, problems and solutions 
that are mentioned in the literature and in the questionnaire about defence integration in the EU. 
This will start from the present with what the EU has obtained after the last treaty of the EU. 
After the Lisbon treaty, two major decisions were made in the field of security and defence. 
First, the creation of the position of High Representative as head of Foreign Affairs and Security 
policy and vice president of the European Commission. Second, the creation of the European 
External Action Service (EASS) (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, 57). By doing this, the EU tries 
to bring more efficiency and coherency inside of the EU because institutions have now the 
capability to cooperate more with one another. 
5.2 Economical motives for defence integration and cooperation 
“Pooling and sharing of resources cost less” and therefore, it is highly beneficial for the member 
states according to the EDA (European Defence Agency, n.d.). This idea of pooling and sharing 
is also mentioned in the cases in chapter four. For example, the navy cooperation and integration 
with Belgium, BeNeSam, is a beneficial cooperation for both nations because there are no 
“double-costs”. However, this economic benefit can also be found in the case of the AAR-
system of the EDA. As mentioned in the case, member states individually cannot bring-up the 
resources to create a fully functioning AAR-system. Therefore, the EDA stepped in and 
presented a solution on European-level.  
Without further increasing the budget for defence spending, the member states need to explore 
other routes to keep their armies up-to-date. However, as pointed out by France and Witney, 
when the economic crisis hit, the member states made statements that pooling and sharing was 
the future (France and Witney, 2013, p.2). However, there was no increase in budget and no 
real effort was made leaving their defence sector to decrease in quality and quantity. 
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According to van Duuren, another economic reason can be found in the ideas of citizens about 
defence. The citizens want the most defence for their payed taxes (van Duuren, 2016, Appendix 
2 Part 2). In other words, if this means integrating to keep the forces up-to-date without paying 
more taxes, this would be acceptable. This can be connected to a constructivist way of thinking 
because in this case the norms about defence and the norms of how to reach this are altered, 
making integration in defence possible. 
5.3 Efficiency motives for defence integration and cooperation  
Besides the economic benefits, other authors think that efficiency is also an important reason 
for cooperation. 28 member states acting on their own could have conflicting effects on external 
and even internal problems in defence and security. Therefore, member states decided that it 
was for the best to cooperate more in this policy field. However, this was not only for the 
member states. As mentioned before, the EU institutions adapted and they need to adapt further 
to be more coherent as well.  
As mentioned in the introduction, the creation of the EEAS as a part of the treaty of Lisbon was 
the first big step to a more coherent EU. However, according to van Duuren, army reservist 
(Maj/ret) and part of the EPISECC advisory board, this only solves one part of the problem. 
According van Duuren, the institutions still struggle internally with one another to get more 
competences resulting in institutions doing the same thing without consulting each other (van 
Duuren, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2).  In other words, clearer rules on who does what are still 
necessary to make the EU a more efficient actor. 
The authors Major and Mölling make the same argument, they state that, “first, there are tight 
deadlines that must be met. Just as in the case of political decisions, the planning of an operation 
must be completed within only five days. Second, different doctrines and rules of engagement 
make it difficult to plan operations. The greatest challenge, however, lies in the third issue, the 
fragmentation of planning and command structures within the EU” (Major and Mölling, 2011, 
p.16). This argument shows how challenging the integration on a EU-level can be. To further 
explain, besides that every member state individually has to say yes, which is time absorbing, 
the EU institutions further increase this ineffectiveness in the planning and by the command 
structures in place. According to Schaper, this is not only the case on a EU-level but in every 
form of military cooperation. Depending on another countries parliamentary approval and 
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status of their armies to do missions, makes cooperation and further steps to integration a 
difficult step to make (Schaper, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2).  
Other researchers, think that the ineffectiveness of the EU is the result of competition with 
NATO (Coelmont & Langlois, 2013, p.5). The member states would rather choose to cooperate 
within the NATO than in the EU framework. Schaper, former permanent representative in 
NATO and the UN for the Netherlands, also mentions this. According to Schaper, “when 
looking at military missions we almost automatically look at the options in NATO because they 
already have the expertise in this area (Schaper, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). In addition to this, 
Why should states choose to lose their sovereignty in defence when there is a well-working 
NATO that does not touch upon the sovereignty of countries? Furthermore, because of this, 
member states participated in NATO missions instead of EU missions in the past (Biscop & 
Coelmont, 2012, 104). 
However, de Vries, Strategy Director at the Hill and Knowlton strategies and former State 
Secretary for Defence of the Netherlands, states that EU cooperation and integration is still 
necessary to move forward independently from NATO. De Vries mentions that “the US will 
pull back to its own territory more and more and will not always come to the aid of the EU 
anymore. Furthermore, cooperation would lead to more efficient use of scarce resources instead 
of countries individually moving around” (de Vries, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). With this, de 
Vries explains that the NATO will not necessarily be present forever.  
The idea that countries will use each other’s resources, as mentioned by de Vries, is already a 
reality in the case of the Netherlands. As mentioned in the cases, the Netherlands has already 
integrated a part of their forces with the German Army. In addition to this, this is also happening 
with the naval forces of Belgium and the Netherlands. Furthermore, recently a Dutch tank 
battalion under German supervision was created as well (Ministry of Defence, 2015, np.) and 
there were talks between the Dutch and Belgium Ministers of Defence about integrating their 
air forces (Homan & Rood, 24-06-2016, n.p.). These are all forms of cooperation to use the 
scarce resources the countries have more efficiently. 
Another argument against the idea of some kind of competition with NATO comes from 
Keukenleire and Delreux. According to them, the Common Security and Defence Policy was 
never about territorial defence because that will be the job of NATO (Keukeleire & Delreux, 
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2014, p.173). In other words, NATO will take care of the protection of national defence and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy is more focused on problems outside of the EU borders. 
5.4 Political and practical motives for defence integration and cooperation 
“When looking at defence integration there are two motives: political and practical motives” 
according to Schaper (2006, Appendix 2 Part 2). This is both the case for the EU and the 
member states. For example, expanding the EU toolbox by adding military capabilities to the 
EU could make a big difference to its position in global affairs. For example, conflicts, even 
close to the EU borders, are still part of this world. Therefore, according to some researchers, 
the European Union should increase its military capabilities because eventually the European 
Union has to intervene to promote human rights and democracy (Juncos, 2005, p.97).  
Then again, if political motives of the member states already differ from the start, it will be hard 
to cooperate, let alone finding a common position. For example, according to Ojanen, the 
Western European member states are focused on their global position, meanwhile the Eastern 
European member states are more concerned about their national defence (Ojanen, 2012, p.221). 
Furthermore, currently most of the member states have increased their defence budget because 
of the recent events in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea (The Economist, 2016). 
Therefore, who could blame the Eastern European members to focus more on border defence 
during these times of conflict?  
Another example of conflicts of interest in defence integration between member states, is the 
Arab Spring in Libya. Ginsberg and Penksa mention in their book that, while the focus of 
member states may have been of self-interest because this crisis would concern a former colony, 
the other member states had no interests in the conflicts in Africa at all (Ginsberg & Penksa, 
2012, p.67). With this reason, according to the Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, “you 
cannot force countries to work together” therefore, countries need to cooperate with “like-
minded” partners (Hennis-Plasschaert, 24-06-2015). In other words, integration and moving as 
one on a EU-level could be too much in the current situation. 
However, it must be said that some member states, due to the current events, are thinking 
differently about the security and defence of the EU. Take for example Germany, according to 
some researchers, Germany now realizes that even though they had no interest in a conflict at 
the EU border, the impact on the security of the European Union, including their own, could 
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become immense if left alone (Ginsberg & Penksa, 2012, p.67). In addition to this, this lack of 
interest fired back at Germany and the rest of the EU in the form of a migration crisis.   
Matters that include giving up sovereignty are always a difficult subject for the member states. 
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the member states rather cooperate in a situation where they 
can keep their sovereignty than losing it to an institution in another set-up. In addition to this, 
this is not only why member states prefer NATO but also cooperation under the mandate of the 
UN. Keukeleire and Delreux state that there is a clear difference between the big countries that 
are permanent members in the Security Council and the other countries (Keukeleire & Delreux, 
2014, 121).  For example, the size of the member states, the size of their defence sector and the 
way member states look towards the world is totally different for each member state (Keukeleire 
& Delreux, 2014, 121). In addition to this, the UK and France would never give-up the veto 
they have in the Security Council and then replace it by a system where every member state is 
equal. This can be explained by the realist theory mentioned in chapter three. In this chapter it 
is mentioned that, from a realist perspective, international cooperation is all about the 
distribution of power. Therefore, it would be unlikely that the UK and France would give up 
this power without getting something more beneficial in return. 
Apart from the political motives, there are also more practical motives for integration. As van 
Duuren stated, integration is not always a necessity but can be a result of a natural flow in the 
direction of integration (van Duuren, 2016, Appendix 2 part 2). In other words, the defence 
sector is trying to find a way with the budget they have at their disposal and could for this reason 
flow into integration with other countries. Furthermore, van Duuren mentions that the countries 
acted out of the idea to be better than the other, however, the present countries have more a “if 
you cannot beat them, join them” vision.  
This is something that comes back in the cases mentioned in this thesis as well. To keep the 
forces a future-oriented full-spectrum operational army, there is besides practical needs, the 
political need to keep them up-to-date. In addition to this, having to say as a country that you 
no longer fit the requirements for a combat-ready army is disastrous for a countries position. 
For example, with the Netherlands reacquiring their tank capabilities working together with 
Germany, resulted in a readiness of the Dutch forces in more conflict scenarios than before. 
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5.5 Defence of Multiple Speeds 
“Working together with like-minded partners” is the way to go, as hinted by the Dutch Minister 
of Defence earlier this chapter. This already suggests a possible solution to give defence 
integration in the EU momentum again. To further explain, not all the member states have the 
same interest, therefore, moving forward in smaller groups could be the solution. This would 
than create two or more speeds within the EU. However, this idea is not something new, because 
the idea of small clusters moving forward in integration was part of the adjustments in the 
Lisbon Treaty.  
A big barrier for the current EU is that it has no common position, de Vries agrees with the idea 
that countries, like the Netherlands, need to move forward in a smaller group to secure efficient 
use of resources (de Vries, 2016, Appendix 2 Part 2). According to Schaper decisions made in 
the EU show a paradox. For example, voting to create battlegroups but then never use them, is 
only one of the examples of the EU being a paradox (Schaper, 2016, Appendix 2 Part 2). In 
other words, besides that it is hard to move forward with all the member states on a EU-level, 
the decisions that were made within the EU end up being empty promises. 
One of these adjustments can be found in article 42(6) of the Treaty of the European Union. 
This article states that, “those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria 
and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the 
most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union 
framework” (Foster, 2014, 16). This means that with this article, it is possible for the member 
states to form a cluster and move forward in defence integration. In addition to this, this group 
will be more dedicated to defence cooperation and as result they could become more efficient 
when cooperating. 
Furthermore, according to Article 46(1) in the Treaty of the European Union, “Those Member 
States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 
42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out 
in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council 
and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (Foster, 
2014, p.17-18). This article makes two critical points. First, small clusters can act on an 
international stage with the consent of the Council and the High Representative without member 
states that are not in the cluster. The second point is, setting criteria also means that this group 
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will have no place for free-riders. In other words, where countries can now free-ride on EU 
missions, this not the case anymore when they are part of this cluster.  
Furthermore, Article 44(1) in the Treaty of the European Union states that, “within the 
framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the 
implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary 
capability for such a task” (Foster, 2014, 17). This would leave a group of willing member 
states the possibility to act in situations that make involvement of the European Union unlikely 
or not sufficiently (Nissen, 2015, 21). In other words, not all the member states have to act in 
such a situation. Therefore, if a conflict such as Libya would repeat itself, it would leave 
likeminded member states to achieve their global objectives in international affairs under a EU 
mandate. 
However, integration in smaller clusters is not the only option that member states have. 
According to van Duuren, there are multiple situations, like administrative ingenuity, that could 
create a way forward besides only working together with like-minded countries (van Duuren, 
2016, Appendix 2 part 2). This is consistent with the institutionalist theory because this shows 
that institutions of the EU, if the member states do not act themselves, will pick this up in return 
for more competences. 
Furthermore, moving forward in a cluster while leaving other member states in a different 
“speed”, has also some disadvantages. For example, Mény states that it is the most ambitious 
plan of the European Union ever because all the opt-ins and opt-outs in the various sectors make 
it really hard to make a clear European structure and call this deeper European integration 
(Mény, 2014, p.1347 – 1348). Furthermore, other authors, like Behr and Ojanen, state their 
concern that besides the creation of different camps, also a disconnection between strategies 
and cooperation will take place between the two camps (Behr & Ojanen, 2014, p.41). In other 
words, moving forward in a different speed will come with its challenges as well. 
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Conclusion 
 
After all the readings and looking into a lot of sources, it is clear that the sector of EU defence 
cooperation has still room to grow and adjust. The decades after the EDC created a taboo, 
however, in the current situation member states can talk about defence integration again. 
Therefore, in a time where there is economic crisis and budget cuts it could be the only way 
forward. 
The theories of integration made it clear where to look for motives of integration. From a realist 
perspective, it is all about securing power. However, this can also be a burden on EU defence 
integration. As mentioned in the thesis, member states rather cooperate in NATO and the UN 
because then they can keep their sovereignty, than losing it in the European way of cooperation. 
Leaving the EU stranded with initiatives but without any back-up from the member states. 
Integration in this case could only be interesting if there are benefits. For example, cost 
reduction, joint operation and acquiring the necessary requirements to act globally as mentioned 
in the discussion.  
From a institutionalist perspective, the EU is progressing anyway. As mentioned by van Duuren, 
if the member states do not pick up the problem the EU will pull this towards itself. However, 
the member states could end up regretting this because the fact that it becomes a EU competence 
means fewer or no more influence of the member states on its content. In addition to this, even 
though the EU picks up a project, just like the case of the AAR, it will still not mean that it will 
come true. As also mentioned by Schaper, making promises is one thing, however, in practice 
these promises are rarely used or made a reality. 
Another perspective is that of a constructivist. A good example, can be found in the selected 
cases for this thesis. For example, the case of Germany and the Netherlands shows that over a 
period of time norms of cooperation change and that countries want to talk about integration. 
This is also the point that van Duuren tries to make by stating that the taxpayer wants the most 
defence for the lowest possible amount of money. Therefore, the norm changed and the demand 
made integration an option to fulfil this demand. 
Because integration in defence appears to be stuck at a EU-level, more and more countries move 
forward in smaller clusters. Projects like for example the AAR under the EDA are of course 
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EU-level integration, but until now it is only a project based on intentions. On the other hand, 
countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany wanted to move forward. Furthermore, 
looking at the cases, for these countries it was a necessity to move forward to be able to stay 
operational. As de Vries said in the questionnaire, now that the US is pulling out more of the 
EU sphere of influence, it has become necessary for the EU to act as a global player. Therefore, 
defence integration is not only about benefits for the member states and better resource 
management but also necessary to mean something on a global stage. 
To conclude, by coming back to the thesis question. Member states do not necessarily move 
forward out of discontent of the EU. However, a EU of multiple speeds could function as a 
solution and give the EU defence integration a boost again. For the member states, complete 
EU-level integration is still a step too far, or will never happen at all. Therefore, this could be a 
solid step between not integrating or integrating completely at a EU-level. Then again, it has to 
be mentioned that this could be seen as breaking apart the united project of the EU. Can the 
motto of the EU, united we stand in diversity, still be used if member states act on different 
levels of integration? 
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Appendix 1: 
 
Table 1: 
Source: EDA, about the organizational structure of the EDA 
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Appendix 2: 
 
Part one: Questions asked 
 
1. What is your opinion about the idea that defence is an area where states have to 
cooperate or even integrate with other European Union member states? Is there a future 
for member states of the European Union with this? 
 
2. Do you agree with how the current defence cooperation and integration occurs? For 
example, the way how Dutch sections of the land forces are integrated with sections of 
another member state. 
 
3. Do you think that cooperation between a select group of member states would be better 
than having a common position of all member states who are part of the Common 
Security and Defence Policy? 
 
4. Do you think that states, like the Netherlands, that are going ahead with defence 
cooperation in a smaller set-up is out of discontent for the way defence is handled on a 
European Union–level? Or do you think that the European Union encourages the 
willingness of these member states to integrate more in defence without including every 
member state? 
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Part two: Questions answered 
Questionnaire: Chris van Duuren, army reservist (Maj/ret) and in the EPISECC advisory 
board. 
1. 
Staten zijn altijd vrij om dingen samen op te zetten. Er zijn natuurlijk wel een aantal dingen 
waar dat dan van afhangt of dit ook lukt. Onder gelijkgestemden, bijvoorbeeld, zijn veel minder 
barrières die je moet overbruggen om een samenwerking te laten werken. Verder wil ik als ik 
uit het oogpunt van een belastingbetaler kijk de meeste beveiliging voor elke euro die ik betaal. 
Naast de keuze om samen te werken, is er ook in sommige situaties van ambtelijke 
vindingrijkheid waardoor er meer samengewerkt moet worden. Een goed voorbeeld is de 
huidige vluchtelingen crisis waar sprake was van het doorgeven van een hete aardappel om het 
probleem op te lossen. Een groot probleem is dan ook het geld voor hulp. Ondanks het feit dat 
de Europese Unie de grootste donateur is van humanitaire hulp is dat in de Europese Unie zelf 
niet tot nauwelijks aanwezig. De commissie heeft dit probleem uiteindelijk naar zich toe 
getrokken onder het mom van artikel 122 (1) over de werking van de Europese Unie. Met het 
idee van, als we de lasten krijgen dan willen we ook de macht die daar bij komt kijken. Deze 
vindingrijkheid heeft er uiteindelijk voor gezorgd dat nu ook binnen de Europese Unie 
humanitaire hulp verleend kan worden en er iets gedaan kan worden aan het vluchtelingen 
probleem. 
2.  
Er zijn verschillende manieren en formaten om samen te werken op dit gebied. Maar er is altijd 
sprake van een optimaal formaat. Dit is een formaat dat de minste weerstand bied maar de 
uitkomst het grootst en beste past bij de gestelde doelen. 
Er zijn natuurlijk ook wat problemen waar de huidige structuur van samenwerken tegenaan 
loopt. Binnen de Europese Unie doen de instituten vaak aan bench marking, hoe meer ze werk 
naar zich toe trekken, hoe meer ze aanspraak op iets kunnen maken. Het creëren van 
bijvoorbeeld de EEAS heeft wel voor meer samenwerking gezorgd maar er is nog steeds sprake 
van de dubbele hoed voor de hoge vertegenwoordiger. Omdat haar rang in het geheel al het 
hoogste is, net zoals die directe mensen onder haar, zijn er weinig problemen. Echter, de lagen 
daaronder die onder een commissie DG vallen en anderen die onder de EEAS vallen hebben 
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onderling nog vaak veel getouwtrek. Dit komt omdat beide partijen van nature proberen hun 
onmisbaarheid aan te tonen omdat hun positie, niet zoals bij de hoge vertegenwoordiger, al vast 
staat. 
Naast het formaat van de samenwerking en het volgen van de weg van de minste weerstand, 
heeft defensie ook nog eens te maken met politieke draagkracht dat een groot probleem kan zijn 
in de snelheid van handelen in een periode van crisis. Bijvoorbeeld zoals in veel gevallen van 
de Arabische lente. Er is dus niet echt sprake van goed of slecht maar er is meer sprake van de 
vraag is dit de optimale manier om samen te werken. 
3.  
Dit hangt compleet af van de samenwerking. Een samenwerking op het niveau van lidstaten 
werkt alleen als er recht gedaan wordt aan de doelen en dat alle staten die mee doen er voordeel 
aan houden. Een andere vraag die we constant moeten blijven stellen is, worden we hier beter 
van? Natuurlijk moet er af en toe wel wat water bij de wijn worden gedaan, maar het moet wel 
functioneel blijven. 
Verder is het ook niet zo zeer dat het beter is voor de lidstaten maar, als je bijvoorbeeld naar 
Nederlandse samenwerking kijkt met de buurlanden, een natuurlijk verloop van 
omstandigheden, gelijkheid van ideeën en gemeenschappelijke dreigingen ook een reden 
kunnen zijn om met een kleine groep verder te gaan. Daarbij, lange tijd hebben de landen er 
naar gestreefd om beter dan elkaar te zijn maar, nu lijkt het er meer op dat er uit een ‘if you can 
not beat them, join them’ mentaliteit gehandeld wordt. Ook word het draagvlak voor defensie 
steeds kleiner omdat investeringen in defensie meestal lijden tot een spiraal van geweld. 
Daardoor wordt er steeds vaker gezocht naar een diplomatieke oplossing die goede resultaten 
geeft. 
4.  
Ik denk niet dat het zozeer uit onvrede is maar meer, na wat ik eerder ook heb gezegd, gaat om 
de weg van de minste weerstand. Minder geld zorgt wel tot de noodzaak om te kijken naar 
andere opties, maar zal niet de hoofd motivatie moeten zijn. Op alle gebieden binnen de 
Europese Unie is er wel sprake van een paradox. In het geval van veiligheid, willen we als 
belastingbetaler, ongeacht wie het doet, de meeste veiligheid die mogelijk is voor de laagst 
mogelijke prijs. Maar na een lange periode van rust in dit gebied gaan er vraagtekens ontstaan. 
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Een goed voorbeeld is de Nobelprijs van de vrede die de Europese Unie heeft gekregen. 
Decennia van vrede hebben geleid tot de vraag waarom er nog een defensie nodig is. 
Minder geld is dan een volgende stap voor dit gebied omdat het anders moeilijk te verklaren is 
waarom, in tijde van vrede, er nog zoveel geld naar defensie gaat. Echter, de politieke factor is 
op dit gebied ook heel strek aanwezig. Het verdedigen van de uitgaven of de noodzaak van 
uitgaven aanduiden is uiteindelijk hun taak. Ook voor oplossingen wordt er naar de politiek 
gekeken.  
 
Questionnaire: Jack de Vries, Strategy Director Hill and Knowlton strategies and former 
State Secretary for Defence of the Netherlands. 
1. 
Ik ben daar groot voorstander van. En het is ook noodzakelijk. De VS zal zich meer en meer op 
haar eigen grondgebied terugtrekken en Europa niet altijd meer te hulp schieten. Bovendien 
leidt het tot een efficiëntere inzet van de beperkte defensiemiddelen i.p.v. dat ieder land zijn 
eigen afwegingen maakt. 
2.     
Bovenstaande wens wordt in het huidige Europa niet gerealiseerd bij gebrek aan eensgezindheid. 
Om het tweede doel van die samenwerking toch te bereiken: efficiënte inzet van middelen, is 
het verstandig dat Nederland bilaterale samenwerkingen aangaat. Het maakt het echter wel 
versnipperd. Beter zou een model van een Europa van 2 snelheden zijn, waarbij een kleiner 
aantal landen kiest voor verdere integratie. 
3.     
Zoals hierboven gesteld gaat het om realiteitszin. Het totaal is natuurlijk altijd krachtiger dan 
slechts een deel van de som, maar de werkelijkheid is dat de eenheid in Europa ver te zoeken 
is. In ieder geval moet goed worden afgestemd op de NAVO behoefte stelling. Een kleine groep 
landen kan de weg van verdere integratie kiezen. 
4.     
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Nederland was van oudsher inderdaad meer federalistisch, daar zijn we echter ook wel van 
teruggekomen onder druk van het populisme en de binnenlandse weerstand. Ooit was de keuze: 
verdieping of verbreding. Na de val van de muur is noodgedwongen gekozen voor verbreding 
en is feitelijk het oorspronkelijke ideaal achter de horizon verdwenen. Het is dus niet zozeer 
onvrede als een consequentie van de gemaakte keuzes. Het is dus vooral kiezen voor waar het 
efficiënter kan. 
 
Questionnaire: Herman Schaper, Professor at Leiden University, Senate member of the 
Netherlands and former permanent representative of the Netherlands for both the NATO 
and the VN. 
1. 
Samenwerken is zeker een gedachte die in opkomst is. Een goed voorbeeld is de samenwerking 
tussen het Nederlandse en Duitse leger. Voor een kleiner land met veel bezuinigingen, is dit 
een vanzelfsprekende weg die je inslaat. Bij integratie spelen er dan ook vaak twee redenen 
mee. De eerste is een politieke reden. Een voorbeeld hiervan is Eurocorps in Straatsburg, met 
Duitsland opgericht, waar verschillende landen ook lid van zijn geworden. De andere reden is 
meer gericht op het praktische nut van samenwerken en integreren. 
Samenwerken is een ding maar integreren is iets anders. Als we van integratie uit zouden gaan 
binnen de EU, dan zou de EP bepalen wanneer er wel of niet overgegaan word op actie. Maar, 
op deze manier integreren gaat wel erg ver, zelfs voor Nederland. Het Nederlandse parlement 
zal daar niet mee instemmen. Het Duitse en Nederlandse leger spreekt zelf over integreren, 
maar het is mij niet echt duidelijk hoe. Dit zal meer zijn op deelgebieden, maar iedereen zal wel 
aanspraak kunnen blijven maken op het eigen onderdeel. Dit zal op EU niveau niet echt 
mogelijk zijn. Echter, de manier van samenwerken in de NAVO, dat vinden we allemaal prima, 
vooral de roterende machtsstructuur zoals we die kennen maar tot een Europees leger zal het 
naar mijn idee niet komen. Dit vooral omdat partijen zoals de SP, CU en SGP erg hameren op 
behoud van soevereiniteit.  
Wanneer we kijken naar de toekomst en ons eigen voorbeeld met de Duitsers, zou ik zeggen 
dat er inderdaad een toekomst is in samenwerken op het gebied van defensie. De vraag is echter, 
is dit daadwerkelijk binnen de EU? Er zijn geen specifieke doelen vastgesteld in de EU en met 
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de NAVO zijn er ook mogelijkheden om op andere niveaus samen te werken. Het kan dus dat 
er meer samenwerking komt, maar dit is per definitie niet gekoppeld aan de EU. In de NAVO 
gaat het bijvoorbeeld al heel ver, maar gek genoeg wordt daar niet zo veel aandacht aan besteed. 
Als je serieus militair aan de slag wil gaan, dan kijk je naar de NAVO en niet naar de EU. 
Ondanks alle ambities die de EU op papier heeft staan. 
2. 
Het is een praktische noodzaak. Echter, een nadeel hieraan is de parlementaire goedkeuring. 
Het duurt te lang voor ieder land om deze goedkeuring te bewandelen. Je bent ook afhankelijk 
van hoe defensie ervoor staat in andere landen. Zelfs in het geval van Nederland meldt de 
Algemene Rekenkamer dat er sprake is van slecht management, verminderde efficiency, slechte 
ICT en geen munitie of reserveonderdelen. Met het combineren van Belgische en Nederlandse 
marine kun je dit op niveau houden. Er zit een krachtige logica achter samenwerken, maar er is 
vaak sprake van praktische bezwaren. 
3.  
Het verdrag van Lissabon geeft een mogelijkheid om in een kleine groep verder te gaan, maar 
dat is nooit gebeurd. Centre for European Policy studies: more Union in European Defence 
heeft ook een stuk geschreven over die permanente cooperation, ook op niet-militair gebied, 
maar het komt er nooit van. Van de EU samenwerking wordt gewoonweg geen gebruik van 
gemaakt.  
4.  
De enige weg voorwaarts is het per deelgebied van materiaal en troepen samen gaan werken. 
Dit kan alleen door een paar landen te verzamelen in een groep en daarna gezamenlijk materieel 
aanschaffen. Dit is al het geval bij de Belgisch/Nederlandse marine. Daarbij, is dit voor een 
belangrijk deel praktische noodzaak. Naast de praktische noodzaak is er ook politieke druk. 
Eurocorps is een signaal geweest dat landen verder wilden. DE landen die mee wilden doen, 
mochten er bij. Echter, het is in zijn geheel nooit ingezet, maar mogelijk wel alleen één 
onderdeel. 
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Dit is een van de karakteristieken van de EU, het verschil tussen retoriek en realiteit! 
Bijvoorbeeld, waarom stemmen we wel in met ‘battlegroups’ en waarom worden ze daarna niet 
gebruikt? Waarom zijn zelfs de mensen die voor zijn, zo terughoudend om ze te gebruiken? Dit 
is bij sommigen te begrijpen, deze lidstaten willen niet militaristisch overkomen vanwege de 
WWII, maar desondanks hebben vele lidstaten hier wel mee ingestemd, maar zijn er niet verder 
mee gegaan. 
 
 
 
